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W MAINE HISTORICAL SOCIETY
Sebastien Racle and Norridgewock, 1724: 




In 1934, Fannie Hardy Eckstorm of Brewer, Maine, a 
life-long friend and student of the Abnaki Indians, pub­
lished an article examining the controversial issues sur­
rounding the life and death of the Jesuit Sebastien Racle 
who served the Norridgewock Abnaki from 1694 until 
his death in August, 1724.1 While Eckstorm accepted the 
major features of the English view of Racle, she added 
elements to this interpretation which seem to make her 
case unassailable. The English, with a few notable excep­
tions, have argued that Racle was a French political 
agent who coerced the Abnaki into taking up arms 
against innocent English settlers. According to this view 
Racle was motivated by his hatred of the Puritan heretics 
and wished only for the concrete establishment of 
French political and religious hegemony in North Amer­
ica. Many of the surviving documents—angry letters 
from Racle to the English governors and dispatches from 
the French governor to Racle—superficially support this 
interpretation. Eckstorm added two considerations to 
this argument which seem to prove conclusively her case 
against Racle and which absolve the English of respon­
sibility for the disastrous Indian war of 1722-1727. Eck- 
storm discovered that a significant minority of the Nor- 
ridgewocks bitterly opposed Racle. She further contends 
that Racle’s letters, published posthumously in the 
Lettres Edificantes and now readily available in the 
Jesuit Relations, were fabrications drafted by French au­
thorities to hide their embarrassment at the loss of Nor­
ridgewock and to minimize awareness at the French 
court of Massachusetts’ threat to New France’s southern 
borders. A critical evaluation of Eckstorm’s argument 
shows that while she added important facets to the Racle 
story, her interpretation is, in the main, untenable and 
not in accord with available documentary evidence.2
Despite an imposing array of primary sources, Eck­
storm’s article is not solidly based on the actual issues 
which divided the Abnaki and the English between 1688 
and 1727. When King William’s War erupted in 1689, the 
English hastily, and mistakenly, ascribed the strong Ab­
naki offensive to the interference and machinations of 
the French among them. Massachusetts could not then, 
and in fact never did, examine her own impact on the 
Abnaki. The French provided a too convenient Machia­
vellian symbol to explain the intransigence of Abnaki be­
havior, and Massachusetts’ interest in Indian affairs never 
rose above the level of pragmatic politics. In time, Sebas- 
tien Racle’s imposing presence on the Kennebec River 
led the English to conclude that he, and not their 
short-sighted and arrogant treatment of the Indians, was 
the cause of all their difficulties. Amazingly, this simplis­
tic argument has endured for two hundred and fifty 
years, reaching its culmination in Eckstorm’s closely ar­
gued article.
Sebastien Racle’s residence among the Abnaki before 
the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713 has attracted little attention 
and engendered no controversy. Yet it was during these 
years that the conflict between New England and New 
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France raged most intensely. Racle’s political role should 
be most clearly evident during this period if the Eck- 
storm argument carries any weight. Racle laid the basis 
of his missionary endeavours in these years and learned 
about Massachusetts’ threat both to his mission and to 
Abnaki tribal integrity. Most importantly, Racle learned 
that the administration of New France understood little 
about Abnaki tribal issues.
When Racle arrived on the Kennebec in 1694, the war 
between France and England had created a politically 
charged situation beyond his control. Though the Abnaki 
were clearly alienated by the English, their position be­
tween New England and New France made their in­
volvement in the Imperial wars inevitable. Racle was 
sent to the Kennebec to assist Father Vincent Bigot. By 
the end of the decade he was recalled because he dis­
agreed with Bigot who favored Abnaki-English confer­
ences.3 Racle s absence was short-lived. In 1701 the two 
Bigot brothers were summarily recalled when Brouillan, 
the Governor of Acadia, accused them of acting against 
French interests among the Abnaki.4 Racle returned to 
the Kennebec but his reassignment does not indicate any 
anti-English hostility on his part. Racle’s later actions sug­
gest that he avoided any slavish response to French po­
litical designs and that he carefully weighted alternatives 
before commiting himself to any policy vis a vis Massa­
chusetts.
In addressing Eckstorm’s view of Racle, it is necessary 
to consider the seeming contradictions in the sources 
about Racle’s political activities during Queen Anne’s 
War. In 1702, just before the war, Massachusetts at­
tempted to win the Abnakis’ neutrality. According to 
Racle, Governor Dudley pleaded with him not to “influ­
ence your Indians to make war upon us.” Racle suavely 
replied: “My Religion and my office as Priest were a se­
curity that I would give them only exhortations to 
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peace/’5 Racle seemingly accepted Abnaki neutrality. 
Soon after the Abnaki became actively engaged in the 
war and Racle hurriedly assured Governor Vaudreuil 
that “the Abnakis would take up the hatchet whenever 
he pleased.”6 The contradiction between Racle’s reply to 
Dudley and his words to Vaudreuil is more apparent 
than real. Racle did not lie to Dudley. His mission was 
endangered by the French ministry and Governor 
Vaudreuil who hoped to manipulate the Abnaki for their 
own benefit. The Jesuit disagreed with this policy and, 
in the process, was nearly recalled in disgrace by the 
irate French authorities.
Racle did not accept the inevitability of the war as 
quickly as his words suggest. In 1702 Governor Brouillan, 
referring to the Indians’ meeting with Dudley, reported 
to the Minister of Marine that the Abnaki had concluded 
a treaty of neutrality with the English, and he accused 
Racle of being responsible for the Indians’ capitulation.7 
Pontchartrain, the Minister of Marine, reacted vigorous­
ly: “I was very much surprised,” he wrote to the Jesuit 
Superior, “to learn that one of your fathers was mixed 
up in such a business, and I believe that you will judge it 
proper to withdraw him from there . . . .” Pontchar­
train preferred, he said, “some one who knows better 
how to manage the interests of religion and those of the 
King, which are inseparable.”8
The Minister soon decided that Abnaki neutrality 
would not harm French interests, yet he still declared 
that “His Majesty considered it wrong [mauvais] that 
their missionaries interferred on the side of this neutral­
ity; and I have written in his name to Father De la 
Chaize to have Father Ralle [sic] recalled [retired] and 
to send another priest in his place.”9
Sebastien Racle was not removed. Before the Minis­
ter’s orders reached Canada, the political situation 
changed completely. After a conference between the 
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English and the Abnaki in June, 1703, some Englishmen 
wantonly sacked the home of St. Castin on the Penob­
scot, which the Indians considered an attack on them­
selves. Governor Vaudreuil quickly took advantage of 
the misconceived English attack for he believed that "the 
English and the Abenakis must be kept irreconciliable 
enemies.”10 Vaudreuil sent French officers to the Abnaki 
and together they raided Casco and Wells in August, 
1703.
Sebastien Racle was not responsible for the outbreak 
of hostilities. He did not agree with Vaudreuil. Only af­
ter the attack on Casco did Racle absolve himself of any 
pro-English stigma, assuring Vaudreuil that the “Abnakis 
would take up the hatchet whenever he pleased.” Racle 
realized the drastic consequences the war would have 
and he worked assiduously to minimize the effect of 
Vaudreuil’s war policy on the Abnaki. The other mission­
aries, Fathers Gaulin and Aubry, "met at Norridgewock 
and told the Indians that they must look for some other 
country, for that it was impossible for them to live 
there.”11 With Racle’s support the two priests advised 
Vaudreuil to move the Abnaki to Canada. Without Eng­
lish arms and ammunition, starvation would devastate 
the tribe as English guns could not. Racle ministered to 
the Norridgewocks at the new Canadian mission called 
St. Xavier for the duration of the war.12
The Abnakis’ retreat to Canada dramatically under­
lines the peculiar problems of the Jesuit missions in 
Maine. The location of the Abnaki villages, especially 
Norridgewock, required the Indians to seek material as­
sistance from the English rather than the French. In war­
time the Abnaki depended solely on the French and the 
Jesuits’ problems were simplified. In time of conflict, the 
French governor directed the Abnaki through his of­
ficers. In peacetime, the Jesuits coped with the complica­
tions of English-Abnaki relations alone. The Jesuits, and 
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particularly Sebastien Racle, became the single factor 
providing stability in the policy formation of the turbu­
lent post-war years. They directed Vaudreuil’s fumbling 
efforts to comprehend the importance of the Abnakis* 
independence for the welfare of New France.Tempered 
in war, Sebastien Racle’s mettle would be tested by 
peace.
The Treaty of Utrecht, ending Queen Anne’s War, was 
a serious blow to French interests among the Abnaki. By 
leaving the issue of Abnaki intelligence unsettled, the 
treaty contributed to the eventual conflict which en­
gulfed that tribe and Sebastien Racle. The French lost all 
of Acadia to Great Britain—though its boundaries were 
never settled13—and Massachusetts responded to her In­
dian problem with confident fervor. Governor Dudley 
declared that the Abnaki would not be pacified “untill 
some English settlements be established ... to govern 
them, and their priests be kept from them . . . ”14 This 
dual policy caused the explosive confrontation between 
the Abnaki and the English. These are the very issues 
which Eckstorm ignores.
Eckstorm completely misconstrues French policy to­
ward the Abnaki after Utrecht. Vaudreuil did not intend, 
as she asserts, “to stir up Indian war with the English in 
time of peace ”15 Racle actually welcomed peace
and opened negotiations with Colonel Moody to halt the 
bloodshed.16 The French authorities knew that the terms 
of Utrecht threatened New France but their initial re­
sponse was to transfer the Abnaki to their new strong­
hold on Cape Breton. Vaudreuil obviously did not under­
stand the Abnaki and Father LaChasse, then missionary 
to the Penobscots, told him that he “must be ignorant of 
the extreme attachment that these Indians bear their 
country . . . .”17 The Jesuits did not hesitate to disagree 
with either Vaudreuil or the Minister of Marine when the 
Abnakis’ interests were at stake. Similarly, the priests in­
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sisted on maintaining the Abnaki in Maine not to spite 
the English but, as time went on, in spite of the in­
creasingly abrasive behavior and demands of Massachu­
setts.
Fannie Hardy Eckstorm thought that “the more desper­
ately the priests worked for France, the more firmly did 
their own Indians oppose them.’’18 While she correctly 
emphasizes the growing internal conflict among the Nor- 
ridgewocks, her conclusions about its causes and French 
responsibility must be considerably altered. A misdated 
document led her to believe that the Norridgewocks 
were seriously opposed to Racle as early as 1718,19 and 
the identification of the pro-English Indians is more com­
plex than she supposed. Eckstorm does not make the dis­
tinction between Norridgewock and the other Abnaki vil­
lages and she does not identify Indians hostile to Racle 
at Norridgewock. The evidence indicates that the Penob­
scot and St. John Indians were most seriously pro-Eng­
lish,20 and though there were certainly pro-English In­
dians at Norridgewock, their strength in 1717-1718 was 
unimportant.
The English documents, on which Eckstorm heavily re­
lies, ignore the distinction between the words of indi­
vidual, anglophone Indians and the expressed intention 
of the entire tribe. On one occasion Captain Westbrook 
showed the Indians a letter from Racle to Governor 
Shute. The Indians listened attentively and then declared 
that “the Jesuit Lied, and he was very wicked.”21 Eck­
storm accepted uncritically this incident and asserted 
that the Norridgewocks “had come to distrust their 
priests and said openly that they lied.”22 There is no indi­
cation, however, that these Indians were from Norridge­
wock. Eckstorm clearly violates her evidence in any case 
by crediting the words of a few unidentified Indians 
over the unmistakable opposition expressed by the Nor­
ridgewocks at every conference with Massachusetts. The 
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establishment of Racle’s unpopularity among the Nor- 
ridgewocks is more difficult than Eckstorm would have 
us believe.
Much of the conflict among the Norridgewocks, and 
the opposition to Racle, was produced by individual 
sachem’s efforts to curry favor with the English in evi­
dent disregard to their larger tribal responsiblities. The 
English, and Eckstorm, blithely ignored this aspect of 
the confrontation. Massachusetts carefully cultivated the 
good will of the sachems whenever possible. Some 
sachems, like Bomazeen who was “very inclinable” to 
the English, received special treatment which provoked 
tribal squabbles and jealousy.25 Norridgewock divisive­
ness during this period is not solely attributable to Sebas- 
tien Racle.
The issue which divided the Abnaki came to the fore 
at the Arrowsic conference in August, 1717, and had no­
thing to do with French political ambitions against New 
England. Governor Shute insisted on English claims to 
Abnaki lands with such intransigence that some of the 
Norridgewocks feared the possibility of war.24 Faced 
with Massachusetts’ refusal to compromise on the legal­
ity of her land deeds, the Norridgewock sachems skirted 
the main issue. “Without talking at this time about lines 
and limits, we declare ourselves willing,” the Abnaki 
said, “that the English should settle and occupy, where 
their fathers did, though we very much dislike their 
forts.”25 The Norridgewocks did not repudiate their 
claim of unalienated title to the lower Kennebec or their 
contention that the English might not expand further 
than where they had settled in the seventeenth century. 
The Norridgewocks merely deferred comment until a 
later time.
English expansion alone divided the Abnaki at the 
Arrowsic conference. Sebastien Racle and the English 
viewed the land issue differently and Racle led the Ab- 
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naki to believe that they could rely upon French aid to 
maintain their title to the Kennebec. Racle angrily threat­
ened Governor Shute with the inevitability of French 
aid.26 Grants from the French King for the Indians’ sup­
port, in addition to the construction of a chapel at Nor­
ridgewock with French funds, reinforced this impression 
on the Indians. Racle encouraged Abnaki antipathy to 
the English settlements but he behaved openly; he would 
not have advised the English of his intentions had he 
been a French agent. Racle did not invent Norridgewock 
irritation with Massachusetts. Even the Penobscots and 
the St. John Indians rebuffed English agents when they 
suggested that they acknowledge the British king.27 
Those Indians also made it clear that English settlements 
would not be tolerated.
Racle was not primarily concerned with French stra­
tegic interests in Acadia. He did not incite the Abnaki 
against the English. Rather, he encouraged them to kill 
English cattle in an effort to halt the settlements. When 
Governor Shute assured the Council of Trade as early as 
1718 that he could “prevent a war breaking out/’28 Sebas­
tien Racle was pressing only for a boundary settlement. 
Racle warned Governor Vaudreuil that Abnaki-English 
antagonisms could be solved only by the prompt settle­
ment of the boundary between New England and New 
France. He urged Vaudreuil to convince the Minister of 
Marine of the issue’s importance.29 The Council of 
Marine, rather than Racle, immediately saw the situation 
in the pragmatic terms of imperial policy and contended 
that “the English pretensions are exorbitant.”30 Support 
for the Norridgewocks was not forthcoming, however. 
Vaudreuil was cautioned to do nothing to jeopardize 
France’s alliance with Great Britain.31
Without any consensus among the French authorities 
about the confrontation, the Abnaki and Sebastien Racle 
were severely tested between 1719 and 1721. During this 
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period, and not earlier as Eckstorm supposes, the Nor- 
ridgewocks’ initial anti-English resolve partially col­
lapsed. Racle remained highly irritated by the Rev. Jo­
seph Baxter’s feeble efforts to Calvinize his Catholic con­
verts. The pressure of settlement did not subside and the 
clandestine liquor traffic flourished unabated. “There is 
no Justice amongst the English,” Racle asserted. 32
The English refused to consider the impact of their 
policy because Sebastien Racle conveniently explained 
for them the Abnakis’ refusal to acquiese to their terms. 
When the Norridgewocks demurred again to admit the 
validity of English land deeds to the Kennebec in 1720, 
the English commissioners quickly ascribed their testi­
ness to the “Cunning Insinuations of that Incendiary the 
Priest.”33 Eckstorm overlooks this aspect of the story. 
She might well have asked why the English found 
Racle’s advice to his Indians “Cunning Insinuations,” but 
their inquiry points away from her conspiracy thesis.
When the English offered—through the ever-faithful 
Bomazeen—to send some Abnaki to Great Britain, Racle 
exploded. He curtly declared that if any of the Norridge­
wocks accepted he would “drive them forever from the 
Church.” This “railing letter,”34 as the English put it, 
minced no words. “Any treaty,” Racle insisted, 
particularly that of Arrowsic is Null, if I don’t ap­
prove it, though the Indians have consented, for I bring 
them so many reasons against it that they absolutely con­
demn what they have done.” Racle was especially an­
gered by Englishmen covertly seeking information about 
him from his Indians. “They inquire about my words: do 
they intend to unite against me to drive me from my mis­
sion,” he demanded. Racle added that “W hatever you 
think you can’t move me.” The Jesuit closed with a frank 
declaration of intent by warning the English to recall 
their settlers, “for assuredly,” he promised, “there shall 
not one remain there.”35
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The Norridgewocks continued only to kill English 
cattle despite these threats. Massachusetts made plans for 
an Indian conference to demand satisfaction for dam­
ages as well as hostages guaranteeing the future peaceful 
conduct of the Indians. Significantly a minority of the 
Executive Council held that it was not “just for this 
Govemmt. to encourage private persons to settle”36 on 
the Kennebec. The House of Representatives neverthe­
less resolved to send 250 men to Norridgewock to arrest 
Sebastien Racle.37
The conference opened first on November 25, 1720, 
with the Indians requesting that “the English people may 
be removed from Merry Meeting” Bay. As usual the com­
missioners refused to consider the Indians’ point of view 
and they insisted: “What security will you give us for 
your good conduct . . . for we will take your words no 
longer,” Overwhelmed, the Indians enquired: “How 
many skins are we to pay . . Arguing to the last, 
these essentially pro-English Indians agreed to deliver 
200 skins and to surrender four sachems within twen­
ty-five days. When the English wished, at the end of the 
conference, to discuss the settlements, the Indians merely 
replied: “We have said all yt we were ordered to say.”38 
Much to Racle’s disgust, the hostages were presented to 
the Executive Council on January 13, 1721.39
Equally divisive for the Norridgewocks was Governor 
Vaudreuil’s refusal to aid them with French soldiers as 
Racle had promised. The King and Minister wished to 
halt English expansion on the Kennebec but they refused 
Vaudreuil permission to actively help them. When Vau­
dreuil temporized, the Norridgewock sachems at Quebec
retorted with an ironical laugh—Know, that we all who inhabit this 
vast continent will, whensoever we please, as long as we exist, unite 
to expel all foreigners from it, be they who they may.40
The Norridgewocks were hopelessly divided by both 
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the French and the English in 1720-1721 and Sebastien 
Racle moved to strengthen their resolution. Racle’s life 
was in danger from his own Indians, as Eckstorm notes, 
41 but their hatred came from Vaudreuil’s failure to give 
them the support Racle had promised and not because 
the Jesuit worked desperately for French interests.
Racle began to undermine the pro-English Norridge­
wocks because he knew that the English had ordered 
them to abandon him.42 When Massachusetts set a date 
to hear the Abnaki response on his dismissal, Racle de­
cided to pack the conference. He invited the Canadian 
Abnaki of St. Francis and Becancourt to join the Nor­
ridgewocks and, at his suggestion, Vaudreuil hurried to 
insure their compliance.43 “I think you will find,” Inten­
dant Begon assured Racle, that the governor’s speech to 
those Indians was in “the Sense proposed by you.”44 
Though Vaudreuil and Begon realized that only Racle’s 
gamble could recoup the loss of French prestige at Nor­
ridgewock, the priest’s determination frightened them. In­
tendant Begon warned Racle three times about the “pru­
dence with which we Deem ourselves obliged To Act to­
ward the English, so that we may not Commit our­
selves.”45 Vaudreuil and Begon feared that Racle would 
not keep French interests in mind while confronting 
Massachusetts and they sent the Jesuit Superior, Father 
LaChasse, to the Kennebec to observe the proceedings. 
On July 28, 1721, the two Jesuits and Castine the young­
er, marched into Brunswick at the head of 200 Indians 
and openly defied the English. The confrontation 
panicked Massachusetts. The Indians refused to compro­
mise further, demanded that the English abandon their 
settlements, and that the hostages be returned.46 Massa­
chusetts could not compromise with these demands and 
within a year war was a reality between the Abnaki and 
the Bay Colony.47
87
Eckstorm does not treat the escalation of this conflict 
and, more seriously, her interpretation of the English at­
tack on Norridgewock overlooks inconsistencies in the 
English sources and exaggerates the French response to 
the attack. The French authorities had nothing to hide 
from the Ministry of Marine; Eckstorm only supposes 
that they were embarrassed by the loss of Norridgewock.
Historians have divided into two camps on the issue of 
the English attack on Norridgewock on August 23, 1724. 
The English follow the sworn reports of the at­
tackers—actually the testimony of Captain Harmon. 
Most writers supplement Harmon’s two accounts with 
Thomas Hutchinson’s History of Massachusetts-Bay 
which critically examines Captain Mouton’s version of 
the attack as well. The French view rests with three 
men, Governor Vaudreuil, and Fathers LaChasse and 
Charlevoix, who in turn follow the surviving Norridge- 
wocks. Eckstorm modifies these two, older views.
Eckstorm reports that Racle was forewarned that the 
English were on their way to Norridgewock. While she 
attributes the warning to the prophetic mutterings of an 
Indian shaman, or medicine man, Racle’s last letter writ­
ten on the afternoon of his death suggests otherwise.48 
Returning from their latest expedition, some Indians re­
ported that 200 men were coming to “drive them out of 
their camp . ” Racle thought that the possibility was
remote:
But I said to them, how could that be, seeing we are daily surround­
ing and making inroads upon them Besides, in all the war you
have had with them, did you ever see them come to attack you in the 
spring, summer, or in the fall, when they knew you were in the 
woods.49
Racle’s statement was correct; the English always avoid­
ed campaigns in the summer when the troops were 
susceptible to disease.50
Eckstorm’s claim that Racle “need not have lost the 
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mission if he had taken a warning given him in ample 
time/’51 is a serious error. Sebastien Racle neither ridi­
culed the Indians’ fear of an invasion nor convinced 
them to stay at Norridgewock. The old priest told Fath­
er LaChasse that the Indians
Hearken to all my reasons aforegoing, but follow their own. They de­
sign to quit the village for a fortnight, and to go five or six leagues up 
the river, they proposed it to me, and I have given my consent
The Indians retreat from their village was only hours too 
late.
When their neared Norridgewock around noon of Au­
gust 23, the English decided to divide their forces. Cap­
tain Harmon, the commander-in-chief for the expedition, 
oddly preferred to scout the corn fields, leaving the task, 
responsibility, but not the credit to Captain Moulton.53 
The commander by default proceeded directly to the vil­
lage. At this point the ensuing attack becomes obscure. 
Moulton’s account, as given by Hutchinson, contradicts 
one of Harmon’s two accounts in the Boston newspapers. 
At question in this conflict of English sources is the prob­
lem of the stockade, despite the fact that Eckstorm confi­
dently asserted its existence.
Both Governor Vaudreuil and Father LaChasse re­
ported that the village was not enclosed,54 though there 
is still extant a map drawn by Joseph Heath in 1719 de­
scribing Norridgewock as a fort “Built with Round 
Loggs nine foot long one end set into the 
Ground . . ”55 Interestingly, Harmon’s accounts in the
Boston papers and Hutchinson are silent about the stock­
ade. Eckstorm states that the New England Courant men­
tions the east gate. The newspaper actually said, less sub­
stantially, that the plan of the offense was to place the 
troops so that the Indians “could in no way avoid them 
by running into the River.”56 Certainly a stockade was 
not essential to, and probably would hamper, that strate- 
gem.
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Even the other English version does not solve the prob­
lem. According to Harmon’s second story, action ensued 
after their “approach within Pistol Shot” of the town.57 
But Hutchinson says that the village
about 3 o’clock suddenly opened upon them. There was not an Indian 
to be seen, being all in their wigwams. Our men were ordered to ad­
vance softly and to keep a profound silence. At length, an Indian 
came out of one of the wigwams and, as he was making water, 
looked round him and discovered the English close upon him. He im­
mediately gave the war whoop and ran in for his gun. The whole vil­
lage took the alarm, and the warriors ran to meet the English, 
the rest fled to save their lives.58
Though the two accounts differ, neither makes provision 
for the stockade. It seems that the Indians would have 
had time to close the gates. It cannot be proven that the 
gate was left open so that Racle could flee to safety. Eck­
storm only supposed that his house was outside the enclo­
sure as it was at Penobscot; there is no evidence of that 
and Heath’s map does not mention it. Even if we accept 
Moulton’s account we cannot establish the stockade’s exis­
tence. Eckstorm emphasizes the issue because she be­
lieved that Vaudreuil and LaChasse had much to hide in 
the loss of the most important Abnaki village. But they 
had not evaded the loss of Penobscot though it was as 
important as Norridgewock.59 Nor did they hide the fact 
that many Abnaki fled to Canada at the beginning of the 
war. In any case, the French Ministry could not hold 
Vaudreuil responsible for a defeat in which their denial 
of aid played so vital a part.
The French accounts of the attack are clearly no fabri­
cations. Father LaChasse reported what he heard from 
the Indians though he did so with pious embellishment. 
There was real need of inspiring support in France for 
the sorely beleaguered Abnaki nation; in 1726 there was 
little interest in the Jesuit missions of Canada. Jesuits 
were not in vogue at court and the Superior-General’s 
pleas for the Abnaki had fallen on deaf ears since 1713. 
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Racle’s death gave LaChasse an issue to fire French 
popular imagination. He did not invent a myth about 
Racle’s death. lie had known, admired and loved Racle 
since his arrival in New France and the two priests had 
been comrades in diplomatic endeavours for the Abnaki. 
LaChasse’s eulogy was not intended to be a dispassion­
ate review of the ease.00
Governor Vaudreuil, in his official dispatch, did not 
romanticize the attack as did LaChasse. The governor de­
scribed the sudden attack without exaggeration.01 The In­
dians who survived the first volley tried to hold the Eng­
lish while the women and children raced for the river. 
Without dramatic effect, Vaudreuil described Racle rush­
ing from his house only to be immediately cut down by 
an English volley.02 It is this account from the surviving 
Norridgewocks that has inspired the popular “martyr” 
myth of Racle’s death. Eckstorm reacted not only to in­
consistencies in the French sources but also to their un­
critical acceptance.03
Vaudreuil’s account is not surprising. When the Indians 
returned on the following day, they found Racle’s body 
with the dead chieftains heaped in the center of the vil­
lage', and hence', the' steiry e>f the priest’s hereric death.01 
The Indians elid not witness Racle’s armed defense' and 
they did ne>t see' Lieutenant Jaepies shoot him. Eckstorm 
thought it improbable that there' were any remains left 
to be* nmurneel because' the' village' was burned by the re­
treating force's.05 The' English slept in the village,how­
ever, and with 128 men to bivouac, it is likely that the}’ 
nmveel all the' be>elies from the' cabins into the' center of 
the' village. The' returning Indians understandable' con­
cluded that Rack' died surrounded by the' village sa­
chems.
In retrospect it seems incredible' that Racle’s death has 
aroused such intensity of feeling. Admirers and de- 
traeteas alike' agree' that he was an extraeadiiuuy man.
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Shrouds of infamy and sanctity have been thrown upon 
him though either claim is extreme. It is preposterous to 
claim that he was motivated by an inveterate hatred of 
the English. It is equally absurd to lay at his feet the bur­
den of war guilt. The record speaks for itself. Racle en­
couraged no atrocities. No Englishman was killed before 
an Abnaki was. No Englishmen were abducted until, in 
Abnaki eyes, four of their chieftains were. Nor were the 
settlements harrassed until they had passed an explicitly 
declared line, and the English were well aware of that 
line.
Racle was not a French agent. His nationality was 
secondary to his personal commitment to the Abnaki. He 
feared, but accepted, Abnaki trade with the English. He 
remained a realist though he opposed the continual Eng­
lish encroachments on the Kennebec. He accepted the 
existence of Brunswick, Topsham and Georgetown but 
barred further expansion. He was no sly political 
intriguer. He described his point of view to Governor 
Shute who promptly rejected it, time and again. The 
causes of the war of 1722-1727 are complex and the “vil­
lain theory” along with the “martyr theory” must be dis­
carded as simplistic. The very readiness of the English to 
attribute Abnaki mischievousness to Racle’s influence is, 
in itself, enough to discredit that view.
The wildly divergent views of Racle do not stem from 
any deviousness in his actions. Rather the conflict of 
interpretations has come from a polarization of the 
secondary sources and a partial consideration of the 
primary testimony. The English hastened to condemn 
what they saw as a mad, Jesuitical plot against their fron­
tier ancestors. The French were no more impartial. They 
supported the martyr myth because Racle opposed the 
English heretics who envied his success with the Abnaki. 
In the process, Sebastien Racle emerged not as the deter­
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